Basics About Conditionals

1

if P, [then also] Q
(antecedent: P; consequent: Q; conditional)

Q, if P

$P \rightarrow Q$

P suffices for Q

Q is necessary for P

Only if that P is also true that Q

P only if [also] Q

- different kinds of conditionals?
- different theories about what conditionals mean and how they work?

- usually philosophers understand to be silent about whether Q came after (and because of) P, or before P, or at the same time
- silent about what's true when not-P, ~P, ¬P
- silent about what you can conclude from Q

1

if P, then Q

$P \rightarrow Q$

P only if Q

2

if Q, then P

$P \leftarrow Q$

P, if Q

Converse of 1

3

P if, and only if, Q

P iff Q

$P \leftrightarrow Q$

either both are true or neither

biconditional

if you know	and you also learn	you can conclude
	P	Q
if P then Q	not Q	then P must not be true, they, either
	Anything else for example: not P OR: Q	nothing

4

not Q → not P

Contrapositive of 1

X and Y are [qualitative] duplicates ⟺ they have all the same intrinsic properties
exactly alike/similar
copies of each other
- perhaps at different times
- they may have different locations, histories, relations to other things

Leibniz's Law

If X and Y are [one and the same quantitatively/numerically the same; just 2 labels for 1 single thing] [individual object — particular event property ...?] ⇒ they have all the same properties

? ⇐ is controversial, usually not part of what people mean by "Leibniz's Law"

Contrapositive:

If x and y differ in any properties ⇒ they can't be one and the same individual object

Notes

1. ... have all the same properties at any one time
2. X is F
   Y is G
   So X can't be one & the same thing as Y ??

   X is F
   Y is G
   Nothing can be both F and G
   So X can't be one and the same thing as Y

   X is F
   Y is not F
   So X can't be one and the same thing as Y
3. You might think "X is F" but have made a mistake.
   The argument is about what follow if it's really true that X is F, etc.
4. Leibniz's Law can never deliver the conclusion that X and Y are identical (one and the same thing).
   Only that they aren't one and the same thing.

Using Leibniz's Law to Argue for Dualism?

Materialists

My mind isn't any substance or object

My mind M is the same substance as my brain b

Dualists

1. No it's not (by Leibniz's Law)!
2. Your mind is a nonphysical substance s

Arguments of kind 1. Question-begging

for example: divisibility (having parts)
taking up space
can think and feel
immortal

Arguments of kind 2. Cheat by "equivocating" (in my mind / not in my brain)

Arguments of kind 3. I have special epistemological relations to my own mind that no one else has to it

I don't have to anyone else's mind, nor to my physical objects, including my brain

(My mind is "essentially private" or something I have "special or privileged access" to)

Example of Poirot

We all know I've discovered that I think that probably	he wasn't in the mansion last night.

Lex doubts whether Superman is still alive
Lex does not doubt whether that reporter he sees is alive.
?? So Superman cannot be that reporter Lex sees

perspectival or "intensional" premises	About what someone doubts or knows or thinks or expects or hopes or fears or has evidence about...

Unsafe or illegitimate to apply Leibniz's Law to premises like these